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Danger-Inequality of Resources
Present: Can the Environmental




The environmental dispute resolution field has grown rapidly since its advent
in 1973, when two mediators, Gerald Cormick and Jane McCarthy, undertook the
first documented attempt to settle an environmental dispute.' Since this initial
effort, the use of mediation in environmental disputes has grown rapidly, leading
to the continual evolution and improvement of the field. Despite this progress,
mediation in environmental disputes remains as it began: a hotly contested issue,
with prominent and influential commentators vigorously debating whether it is an
appropriate device to resolve environmental disputes.
One issue critics of mediation focus on is the role, or perceived role, that
inequality of resources2 plays in the environmental mediation context.3 The
research for this article began with the common sense hypothesis that an inequality
of resources among the parties always detrimentally affects the mediation process
and outcome. Significant empirical evidence to support this hypothesis, however,
could not be found.4 Of the case studies researched, none specifically focused on
the inequality variable. Most did not even address the presence or effect of
inequalities on the mediation efforts, even where one of the parties involved was
typically viewed as a less powerful group, such as a citizen group. Why is there
a lack of deep analysis or conclusions, or even a failure to address this issue when
inequality of resources is considered important in other mediation contexts, such
as family law mediations?
* Associate, Musick, Peeler & Garrett LLP (Los Angeles); J.D. 1996, UCLA School of Law.
The author would like to thank Professor Carrier Menkel-Meadow for her ability to instill both her
knowledge of, and passion for, ADR into her students. The author would also like to thank
Christopher Corbett for his support.
1. GAIL BINGHAM, RESOLVING ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES: A DECADE OF
EXPERIENCE xvii (1986).
2. What a resource is, for purposes of this paper, will be defined in section lB.
3. The questions, issues, and ideas posed in this paper are not entirely specific to environmental
mediation but are common to most multi-party, public disputes. The label environmental mediation
is used, however, because much of the research for this paper was culled from the environmental
dispute resolution area.
4. Most of the "evidence" found was in the form of anecdotal "evidence" or theoretical
discussions.
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The conclusion reached was that such an inequality may not present the
danger to environmental mediation efforts that the critics claim. Two
assumptions underlie this conclusion. First, most parties will only mediate a
dispute if they perceive they possess or can acquire the resources necessary to
mediate successfully; otherwise, they will pursue other methods of dispute
resolution.' Secondly, measures taken to ensure the fairness of the process
provide sufficient safeguards to neutralize any detrimental effects of an inequality
on the outcome of the mediation. Such detrimental effects are neutralized at least
to the extent sufficient to achieve a fair agreement.'
On a more global level, although mediation is an appropriate and successful
means of environmental dispute resolution, groups considering its use should
determine whether it is in their best interests to use it alone or in conjunction with
other dispute resolution mechanisms. Such mechanisms may include political,
economic, administrative, or legal processes.
Further, mediation should not be the dispute resolution method which a group'
utilizes where an important precedent needs to be set or where no degree of
compromise of a group's goals is desirable.7 Precedential value is at stake in
most cases to some extent. An environmental or other public interest group should,
therefore, weigh the importance of this precedential value against the better
quality, individual substantive outcome which may result from participating in
mediation. When the political, economic, and public opinion climates are resistant
to such a change, favorable individual outcomes in a party-driven (rather than
attorney-driven) process like mediation may be more desirable for reasons of
mobilization, organization, empowerment, or publicity-derived precedent than
attempting to achieve precedential change through adjudication.
When a group determines that mediation is in its best interest, the issue of
inequality of resources remains. Concrete measures of whether inequality affects
the likelihood of reaching an agreement and the fairness of the agreement itself are
5. This paper deals only with voluntary mediation efforts, not those mandated by court or statute.
Critics contend that parties may not choose mediation but are forced into it because of a lack of
resources to pursue litigation. There is, however, no empirical evidence to support the theory that
mediation offers time and cost advantages over litigation. BINOHAM, supra note 1, at xxv-xxvii, 136,
140-41. Further, some environmentalists believe that parties lack the resources to stay out of court,
i.e., the lack of resources operates as a disincentive to mediation. Id. at 160.
6. What should be defined as a fair agreement will be discussed in Part II of this paper.
7. For example, the question of whether a hazardous waste site should be developed at all under
a certain set of circumstances may be better handled at a regulatory, administrative, legal, or political
level. Once the question of whether a site will be developed has been answered, mediation may be
the most fair way to decide the "ins" and "outs" of its development It is worth mentioning that the
use of an ADR process, negotiated rulemaking, has recently increased in the environmental regulatory
arena with the passage in 1990 of the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act and the Negotiated
Rulemaking Act Negotiated rulemaking is "a consensus-driven process in which stakeholders directly
negotiate a proposed rule with the agency." Jodie Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the
Administrative State 115-16 (on file with author who is a professor at UCLA Law School). Although
the scope of this paper is confined to the specific problem context, not a policymaking one, some of
the resource gathering techniques discussed in Part III of this paper may be applicable to the negotiated
rulemaking context
[Vol. 1996, No. 2
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not easily found. In evaluating this issue, Part II will present what is and what
should be regarded as a "successful" mediation effort. It will also outline what
may be regarded as resources in environmental disputes. Part III will examine
how inequality of resources affects a mediation effort. It will also propose
procedural safeguards to neutralize the effect of inequality of resources so that a
successful mediation solution may be achieved.
II. DEFINING SUCCESS AND RESOURCES IN TiE ENVIRONMENTAL
MEDIATION CONTEXT
Mediation of environmental disputes is characterized as a consensual,
voluntary process where the parties meet face-to-face to reach mutually acceptable
decisions with the aid of a third-party neutral.' The premise underlying the use
of mediation is that such a process will lead to better quality substantive outcomes
that satisfy, to some extent, the interests of all the parties to a dispute. In other
words, mediation will result in an all-gain solution as compared to the win-loss
paradigm of adjudication and other dispute resolution mechanisms. Despite many
efforts, it is difficult to judge the success of mediation as compared to processes
like adjudication.
A. Defining Success
Commentators have presented several different definitions of success in the
environmental dispute mediation context. Current research has attemptedto defime
success by using criteria such as the number of agreements reached, the stability
of the agreement, the parties' satisfaction with the process, the efficiency of the
process, the value of the process itself, and the fairness of the process.
1. Number of Agreements Reached
In her comprehensive evaluation of environmental dispute resolution
approaches, Gail Bingham defines success in terms of whether the real issues in
the dispute are resolved.9 Using this definition, the most simple measure of
8. LAWRENCE SUSSKIND &JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE 77(1987);
JAMES E. CROWFOOT & JULIA M. WONDOLLECK, ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES:
COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION 19 (1990); BINGHAM, supra note 1, at
Xv.
9. BINGHAM, supra note 1, at 69-70. In preparing her empirical study, Bingham documented
and analyzed 161 cases of environmental dispute resolution. Id. at xvi. Bingham found that
agreements were reached in 78% or 103 of the 132 cases where agreement was the goal. For this
study, Bingham defined reaching agreement as when the parties' "negotiations resulted in a signed,
written agreement or that the parties reported verbally that they had reached an agreement and could
describe its terms." Id. at 73.
1996]
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success for her is the number of agreements reached." Two assumptions
underlie this measure of success: 1) that the parties themselves are good judges of
what the real issues are and whether their issues are resolved adequately; and 2)
that the voluntary nature of the dispute resolution process allows parties to
exercise that judgment freely."
Bingham's definition of success is problematic. It provides no guidelines as
to what the real issues are or to what they should be. Instead, it leaves this
decision up to the parties who, contrary to Bingham's free exercise assumption,
may be constrained by more powerful parties into accepting an undesirable
determination of the issues. Further, Bingham's assumptions only serve to
rationalize the fact that an agreement was reached. They do not provide any
guarantees beyond the "voluntary nature of the process" that the agreement was
the fairest possible agreement for all the parties. Fair process considerations
should be included in any concept of success.
2. The Stability of the Agreement Reached
Bingham's next definition of success includes "how stable the agreement is,
or the extent to which the parties have implemented agreements after reaching
them."'2  Stable agreements are a key attribute of the dispute resolution process.
For Bingham, an agreement's stability is measured by the actual implementation
of the agreement. This measure is based on the presumption made by participants
and outsiders that an agreement enforced is one which the parties and the
community feel was fair. The real problem lies in determining what constitutes
a fair agreement, a problem which will be addressed in Section II.A.6.
3. The Parties' Satisfaction With the Process
The parties' satisfaction with the process is also a standard used to judge the
success of a mediation outcome. 3 A common concept in party satisfaction is
that parties believe that their interests were met and that the mediation achieved
a better quality solution than would have been achieved in another dispute
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. BINGHAM, supra note 1, at 71; SussKiND, supra note 8, at 21, 31 (identifying the four
characteristics of a good negotiated settlement as fairness, efficiency, wisdom and stability). Bingham
found that of 103 cases where the parties reached an agreement, implementation results could be
determined for only 71. BINGHAM, supra note 1, at 77. Of those 71, approximately 70% had been
fully implemented, 14% partially implemented, and only 15% were unlikely to ever be implemented.
Id. Parties were more successful at implementing their agreements in site specific cases rather than
policy disputes. For instance, of the 54 out of 7l agreements which were site specific, 80% were fully
implemented, compared to the 17 of 71 policy disputes, of which only 41% were fully implemented.
Id.
13. Lynn A. Kerbeshian, ADR. To Be Or...?, 70 N.D.L.REV. 381, 385 (1994).
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resolution method.14 Used alone, this criterion presents the most questionable
determinant of success because it only reflects expectations that are bound by
power, resources, and cultural constraints. 5
4. The Efficiency of the Process
The efficiency of the process, in terms of both time and cost, is widely cited
by commentators as an indicator of success.16  According to Bingham, little
information exists to conduct a comparison study of time and costs. 7 Further,
conceptual problems, such as finding samples of the two approaches that are
sufficiently comparable to each other, make it difficult and misleading to compare
litigation and mediation data on the basis of time and cost.' 8
Although the two approaches are not comparable, Bingham did compile time
data on each approach. She found that the median duration of environmental
litigation from filing to disposition was ten months, extending to 23 months if the
case went to trial. The median duration for environmental mediation was five to
six months with only ten percent (10%) of the cases taking over eighteen months
to resolve.' 9
The empirical evidence available does not establish that mediation is
necessarily cheaper and faster than litigation for citizen and public interest
groups." Further, a simple comparison of costs leaves out what is perhaps the
most important measure of success: the fairness and quality of the outcome.
5. The Value of the Process Itself
A further measure of success is the value of the process itself. Value is
defined as a benefit that the parties derive from the process. 2' For example,
parties may feel that they are empowered, have become more knowledgeable about
the opposition and the dispute, or have gained some other benefits. Though it is
an extremely valuable measure, the concept of a fair process alone is too limited
when parties could have used other resources to achieve the same substantive
results. The concept of a fair process must be combined with the concept of a fair
outcome in order to reach a fair agreement.
14. SUSSKIND, supra note 8, at 22, 80-81.
15. Note that these constraints are also found in litigation and other means of dispute resolution
when party satisfaction is used as a determinant of success.
16. See, e.g., SussKiND, supra note 8, at 26; Kerbeshian, 391-92.
17. BINGHAM, supra note 1, at xxv.
18. Id. at xxv-xxvi.
19. Id. at xxvi-xxvii, 136, 140-41.
20. Id. at xxv; DOUGLAS J. AMY, THE POLITICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIATION 72-77
(1987)(noting that expenses and time may be as significant a problem in mediation as in litigation);
Charlene Stukenborg, Comment, The Proper Role of ADR in Environmental Conflicts, 19 U. DAYTON
L.REV. 1305, 1332-35 (1994).
21. BINGHAM, supra note 1, at 71; Kerbeshian, supra note 13, at 392-93.
1996]
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6. Fairness of the Mediation Agreement
Success should be defined in terms of the fairness of an agreement. The
fairness of an agreement, however, is a difficult concept to measure. Fairness
should be defined by subjectively considering what is fair in the eyes of "the
group of parties as a whole" and in the eyes of individual parties. 22  A "fair
balance" should then be struck "between the two objectives when they are
conflicting."2 3 In other words, success, and thus fairness, should be defined in
terms of the parties' perceptions that the result reached was all-gain compared to
the result which could have been achieved in another dispute resolution forum.24
To ensure that the parties actually reach the best quality solution, the
definition of "fairness" must have a second component: that the parties reached
an all-gain result through the utilization of a flexible, party-determined process
with safeguards. In such a process, parties, with the aid of a mediator, utilize
procedures that not only enhance the parties' subjective perceptions of fairness, but
also satisfy objective views of a mediation effort.2" These procedures include the
selection of a knowledgeable third-party neutral mediator, the identification of all
affectedparties and their interests, the establishment of rules and codes of conduct
by the parties, the use of integrative procedures to improve communication and
trust, the effort to equalize resources to the extent possible, and other flexible,
22. Cecilia Albin, The Role of Fairness in Negotiation, 9 NEGOTIATION J. 223, 225 (1993).
To define fairness in objective terms, as in the eyes of a reasonable person, would presume that an
outsider looking into a mediation effort could know, better than the parties themselves, what was in
the parties best interests.
23. Id.
24. Telephone Interview with Lawrence Susskind, Associate Director of the Program on
Negotiation at Harvard Law School (Dec. 1, 1995). (hereinafter "Susskind interview"). Mr. Susskind,
also a prominent mediator, formally refers to this concept as BATNA-the best alternative to a
negotiated agreement SUSSKIND, supra note 8, at 81.
25. Lind and Taylor have advocated this standard due to findings that procedural fairness, in the
sense of process control by the parties, is a potent force for citizens' satisfaction and acceptance of the
outcome of a dispute which cuts across lines of race, income, and politics. E. ALLEN LIND & TOM
R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 64-65, 110 (1988). Further,
Lind and Tyler seem to conclude that, as an empirical matter, such fairness enhances the accuracy of
the outcome. In other words, the outcome reflects the parties' conception of the relations between each
parties' interests and values. Id. at 79-80.
This standard for success can be broadened to adopt a transformative approach which, while
including such considerations of success as agreement and efficiency, seeks to broaden the scope of
dispute resolution to encompass notions of success such as accessibility, affordability, empowerment,
education, and other benefits of participation in the dispute resolution process. Frank Dukes, Public
Conflict Resolution: A Transformative Approach, 9 NEGOTIATION J. 45, 51 (1993). Thus, the
transformative approach envisions a broader role for public dispute resolution efforts. Id. at 48.
According to Dukes, a Senior Associate at the University of Virginia's Institute for Environmental
Negotiation, "this movement rejects that aspect of post-modern critical thought and practice which is
infused with a sense of victimization and hopelessness and which offers no realistic program of
change." Id. Rather, it regards society as capable of productive change through democratic
participation. Id.
[Vol. 1996, No. 2
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party-determined procedures.26 As these same factors work to neutralize the
effect of an inequality of resources, they will be more fully discussed in Part III.
B. Defining Resources in the Environmental Mediation Context
Resources in the environmental mediation context and, more broadly, in the
public dispute resolution process can be defined as different qualities, powers, or
assets that a group may possess. For purposes of this Article, resources include
financial assets, information, scientific and technical expertise, negotiating skills,
political power, and the power to threaten to sue or to pursue other means of
dispute resolution.
III. DOES COMING INTO THE MEDIATION PROCESS WITH AN
INEQUALITY OF RESOURCES AFFECT THE SUCCESS OF THE AGREEMENT?
OR, CAN PROCEDURES UTILIZED AS PART OF THE MEDIATION EFFORT
NEUTRALIZE THE EFFECT OF AN INEQUALITY OF RESOURCES?
Mediation is not always the appropriate means of dispute resolution for
citizen and public interest groups. Citizen and public interest groups frequently
begin, and often continue, their existence with limited resources. As a result, these
"disadvantaged" groups must decide which method of dispute resolution will most
advantageouslyutilize these limited resources and accomplish their goals. A broad
range of alternatives exist and include: legislation, the political process, media
coverage, mediation, other ADR processes, and litigation. A "disadvantaged"
group's most effective use of resources may lie in utilizing several options
concurrently, such as using political pressure and mediation with the threat of
litigation, other combinations, or litigation itself.2 7
Traditionally, litigation has been the method employed by public interest
groups in the environmental arena. Some legal theorists, however, have concluded
that the courts have seldom met environmental litigators' goals.2" In many cases,
courts have failed to force substantive environmental change. Instead, the courts
have focused on procedural considerations out of deference to administrative
agencies, which is heightened by the technical nature of many environmental
26. In any one case, the circumstances may indicate that the use of all procedures is not
necessary to achieve a fair agreement.
27. In fact, community and public interest groups should always utilize political pressure gained
through adverse publicity, demonstrations, and other means because political pressure is a necessary
part of bringing about change. Further, it does not necessitate the profuse use of resources. For
instance, well-timed phone calls may generate significant publicity which, in turn, may generate
significant financial and membership resources.
28. GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE 276-85, 292 (1995).
19961
7
Smith: Smith: Danger-Inequality of Resources Present:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
matters.2 9  Unlike litigation, mediation offers groups the chance to address
substantive issues and influence decision-making processes.3"
When, however, mediation is chosen as a mechanism for change by public
interest or community groups, the issue of inequality of resources must be
addressed. The following section discusses critics' theoretical concerns that an
inequality of technical, informational, political, and other resources will adversely
affect the mediation process. Following this discussion, there will be a description
of safeguards which parties and mediators can utilize to overcome inequalities of
resources.
A. Theoretical Effects of an Inequality of Resources
Several opponents of mediation criticize its use in environmental disputes,
believing that the informal nature of the mediation process coerces those with less
resources to make undesirable concessions which undermine their best interests.
Owen Fiss argues that an informal process allows decisions to be made
without procedural safeguards which less powerful groups may need.3 For
example, a disadvantage in the ability to collect and analyze information may
29. Id.; AMY, supra note 20, at 210 (citing rulings which limit the rights of environmentalists
to challenge administrative decisions on substantive environmental grounds: Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corporation v. NRDC, where the "Court found that environmentalists could only challenge
administrative decisions to develop nuclear power on procedural grounds, not on substantive ones"; and
Chevron v. NRDC, where "the Court's ruling further restricted the role of the judiciary in
independently reviewing agency interpretations of environmental regulations" by finding that "in
complex environmental decisions, the courts should defer to agency expertise and not interfere.").
Rosenberg does acknowledge that litigation has on occasion been effective in improving environmental
quality. Rosenburg, supra note 28, at 277-78, 284-85. Courts' efficacy, however, is dependent on
political and public opinion support. Id. at 284-85. Until that time for more global, systemic change,
ADR methods may be as useful as adjudication, if not more so, in resolving disputes fairly, especially
when the setting of precedent is not an issue.
30. Litigation and ADR may not be as different as commentators note, especially with the rise
in the practice of environmental poverty law (EPL). Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to
Environmental Protection: The Need for Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619 (1992).
EPL seeks to provide justice for groups most affected by environmental problems. Id. at 636. These
groups tend to be comprised of minorities and have traditionally been excluded from the mainstream
environmental movement. Id. at 637-38, 640. As a result, they have a greater distrust for the law. Id.
at 640-41, 647-48. Environmental laws actually legitimate the pollution of their communities and may
further disempower these groups. Id. Thus, these groups are more willing to explore and use non-legal
strategies than mainstream environmentalists. Id. at 640. The EPL approach seeks to use a political
tool, rather than legal tool, to achieve change: community empowerment and education aimed at
pressuring those persons or agencies making the environmental decision. Id. at 648. If chosen as a
method of dispute resolution, the practice of EPL may ultimately benefit ADR and those groups who
use it. The community empowerment model and pressure tactics may result in these groups using
ADR and becoming more effective participants.
31. Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1076-77 (1984). Note that in his article,
Fiss specifically argues against settlement itself as distinguished from mediation, negotiation, or other
ADR processes. His arguments have, however, been applied by other critics to the ADR process.
[Vol. 1996, No. 2
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influence predictions and expectations regarding the outcome of the dispute. Such
an influence may disadvantage the "disadvantaged" party in the bargaining
process.32 Further, a party without adequate finances may be unable to engage
in protracted negotiation or may be forced to settle more quickly. This inability
to continue the process could result in an outcome which is less fair than an
outcome achieved by another method of dispute resolution.33
Some politicians contend that the mediation process undermines
environmental interests because its informal nature co-opts inexperienced
parties.34 More specifically, Douglas Amy further argues that parties with
affected interests will be excluded from the process because mediators, due to their
professional self-interest, have an incentive to limit the number of parties to
increase the chances of the parties reaching an agreement. 5
Even if "disadvantaged" groups are included in the process, it is argued that
they will be ignored or cajoled into making "sweetheart" deals excluding
environmental interests.36 Furthermore, the bargaining process itself will not be
conducted in good-faith when there is an imbalance in technical expertise. This
lack of technical expertise is characteristic of environmental groups who have
minimal resources for bringing in technical experts or gaining access to proprietary
information.37 Amy believes that "it is clear that unequal power between
participants in environmental mediation can undermine the extent to which this
process is representative, fair, and voluntary.
38
In addressing the issue of safeguards, Amy is doubtful that professional
mediators can remedy the imbalance. Most mediators are not interested in
balancing the power of participants, as such an interest would be unprofessional
for scrupulously neutral mediators.39 Instead of balancing the power of the
participants, mediators pressure environmentally-mindedgroups to be "reasonable"
and accept questionable outcomes because mediators have a professional stake in
reaching an agreement.4"
Amy believes that mediators are in a no-win situation: "They can either
accept the situation as is and risk legitimizing an unfair agreement, or they can
attempt to help balance out the power relations, and risk undermining their own
neutrality and career." "1 In essence, the only real option for mediators is not to
32. Id. at 1076.
33. Id.
34. AMY, supra note 20; See also, THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE (RICHARD ABEL,
ED.) (1982).
35. AMY, supra note 20, at 132-33. Amy's statement is pure theory and relies on no empirical
evidence, either from a primary analysis or secondary compilation of data. Bingham rebuts this theory
with empirical evidence. See infra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.
36. AMY, supra note 20, at 134, 136-39.
37. Id. at 143-45.
38. Id. at 148.
39. Id. at 157-58.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 160.
1996]
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participate in unfair bargaining situations.42 "The only short-term safeguard
against the problems of power in environmental mediation is a growing public
awareness of their existence," so that the public can "see through the misleading
aura of equality and fairness that accompanies mediation efforts."43 This illusion
masks the fact that mediation is biased in favor of the more powerful parties."
By masking this bias, mediation disempowers groups by distracting them from
other more effective forms of political action such as litigation.4 5 Because of the
limitations of mediation, Amy feels that the most appropriate role for
environmental mediation is a relatively minor one.46
Generally, Amy raises a valid concern regarding the cooptation of groups
with less resources. He does, however, impart upon his political concerns an
exaggerated importance by theorizing that such concerns work to adversely affect
all mediation efforts. Amy pays only face value to the fact that some of these
same political problems are found in most processes that deal with environmental
issues.
Further, Amy's broad statement that mediators are disinterested in balancing
the parties' power ignores the fact that not all mediators share such a view.
According to Larry Susskind, a prominent environmental mediator, a mediator's
tasks actually involve training parties in basic negotiation skills; helping parties
draft fact-finding protocols, identify technical advisors, and raise and administer
a pool of funds; serving as a repository for confidential information; and balancing
other tasks which can work to balance power.47 This does not include balancing
the level of political power with which each party came into the process. A
balance of political power, however, is not necessary to the success of reaching an
agreement. Success in reaching an agreement takes into account all interests when
resources, skill level, and other sources of power reach a more balanced level.4"
Amy's judgment that "disadvantaged" groups will inevitably be coerced into
accepting undesirable concessions that undermine their interests must be criticized.
This judgment is speculative at best, even paternalistic, for it assumes that an
outsider can second-guess what is in the parties' best interest. When voicing his
42. Id. at 161.
43. Id. at 162.
44. Id. at 129-62; See also, Richard Delgado, et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the
Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WISC. L. REv. 1359 (criticizing ADR on
the grounds that deformalization may increase the risk of racial and ethnic prejudice, placing the very
groups which ADR is aimed at serving at an even greater disadvantage than that which they usually
suffer). Delgado's argument is beyond the scope of this article because it concerns a more global
problem than inequality of resources. Delgado, like Amy, Fiss, and others, discounts the presence of
safeguards in ADR processes which are supposed to control bias. Such safeguards include: the
parties' ability to select their own mediator, mediator accountability for displaying bias such as a loss
of credibility, the use of integrative procedures, and others.
45. AMY, supra note 20, at 194.
46. Id. at 200.
47. SUSSKIND, supra note 8, at 142-43.
48. Lawrence E. Susskind, Mediating Public Disputes: A Response to the Skeptics, I
NEGOTIATION J. 117, 118-19 (1985).
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theoretical concerns, Amy also discounts procedural safeguards and other benefits
available in the practical mediation context.
B. Safeguards Which Can Be Employed in the Mediation Process to
Neutralize the Effect of an Inequality of Resources
Critics of mediation highlight the safeguards of traditional dispute resolution
processes while decrying the lack of safeguards in the mediation process.
Safeguards, however, do exist in the mediation process and can neutralize the
effect of an inequality of resources. In fact, the premise of collaborative problem-
solving efforts, such as mediation, is that a cooperative, flexible process will result
in the better use of resources and create a decision more satisfactory to the parties.
Therefore, mediation will generate a result more likely to be implemented, i.e., a
fair agreement.49
Contrary to Amy's heavy reliance on political power, the power at the
negotiating table in most, if not all, disputes is not commiserate with political
power carried outside of the process."0 Instead, whether an inequality of
resources is likely to affect the outcome of a dispute or whether it can be
neutralized by procedural safeguards depends on other resources the parties may
possess unequally. For example, if one party has a better alternative relative to
others and can go outside the mediation process, then that party has the power to
walk away. This power is likely to result in an outcome favoring the advantaged
party."' If, however, power is a function of technical knowledge or informational
resources, then safeguards such as utilizing coalitions, information sharing, and
resource pools will almost always overcome the inequality.52
1. Pre-Dispute Assessment
Before mediation is undertaken, a pre-dispute assessment should be conducted
between the mediator and key stakeholders to determine if mediation is the
appropriate process. Mediation is not the appropriate process in situations where
the issue is a matter of precedent or where parties determine that their interests
would best be served in another dispute resolution process. When mediation is
appropriate, efforts should be employed to include all affected parties.
Amy argues that parties with affected interests will be excluded from the
mediation process because mediators have a self-interest in limiting the number
of parties in order to increase the likelihood that an agreement will be reached.
Contrary to this argument, Bingham has found that the likelihood of agreement is
49. CROWFOOT, supra note 8, at 20.
50. SussKiND Interview, supra note 24.
51. Id. Mr. Susskind believes that the power of having a better alternative, ie, a BATNA, is the
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not clearly affected by the number of parties involved." Further, during
Lawrence Susskind's twenty-five years of experience as a prominent mediator, he
has found that the number of parties involved in the process has no impact on the
outcome. Rather, the number of issues involved and the "richness" of the
discussions between groups are the important factors. 4 Based on Susskind's
observations and experience, Amy's claim that a mediator has an interest in
excluding groups to keep the process minimal is not well-founded.
Instead, the mediator's interest seems to be best served by achieving a fair
and stable agreement. Such an agreement is achieved by including all groups with
affected interests or by ensuring that the interest of all the groups who are unable
to participate are represented." If any interested party is not included in the
mediation, it may disrupt the mediation process itself or later try to block the
implementation of whatever agreement the parties reach through its power to bring
legal or political action. 6
When it is impractical for a group to participate directly in the mediation, the
group's interest can still be represented by forming a coalition with other groups
having similar interests.5 7 The coalition would then be represented in the
mediation process by either a single person or the smallest number of
representatives feasible." When choosing a representative, coalition members
should consider whether a person has prior negotiation experience, strong
bargaining skills, technical expertise or leadership skills. Throughout the process,
the coalition must maintain effective communicationwith all of its group members
53. BINGHAM, supra note 1, at 99. Bingham states that:
there is no evidence among the cases studied to indicate that a large number
of parties in a dispute resolution process makes it more difficult to reach an
agreement. The average number of parties in the [over 100] cases examined
in this study was just over four, and the range was between two and 40. In
fact, the average number of parties for cases in which the parties failed to
reach an agreement was lower than the average number of parties in cases
in which an agreement was reached.
Id. at 99.
54. SUSSKIND Interview, supra note 24.
55. In June of 1986, the Society for Professionals in Dispute Resolution ("SPIDR") adopted
ethical standards for mediators. The following standard pertains to unrepresented interests:
The neutral must consider circumstances where interests are not represented
in the process. The neutral has an obligation, where in his or her judgment
the needs of parties dictate, to assure that such interests have been considered
by the principal parties.
DISPUTE RESOLUTION: AN OPEN FoRUM 1986 PROCEEDINGS OF FOURTEENTH INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE, (Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution, Cheryl Cutrona, eds.) (1986).
56. John Charles Sassaman Jr., Sighting Without Fighting: The Role of Mediation in Enhancing
Public Participation in Siting Radioactive Waste Facilities, 2 ALB. LJ. Sci.& TECH. 207, 219 (1992).
57. CROWFOOT, supra note 8, at 5, 21, 77.
58. SUSSKIND, supra note 8, at 208.
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to ensure that each affected group's input and core objectives are not sacrificed. 9
Further, the representatives chosen to participate directly in the mediation process
should have the authority to implement the agreement reached.60
2. Safeguards During Participation in Mediation
When the involved groups have decided to pursue mediation, the process
must provide each member with an equal voice. This applies even if the groups
do not have equal power outside mediation. Because of its flexible, non-
adversarial nature, mediation may provide several safeguards to neutralize
inequalities among the groups.
a. Procedures to Prevent the Cooptation of "Disadvantaged" Groups
1. Training
In the words of Lawrence Susskind, "while informal dispute resolution efforts
should not be construed as a means of altering the fundamental balance of political
power, the parties to a dispute need not have political power for an informal
negotiation process to produce better outcomes than those produced through more
traditional means."'" In Susskind's experience as a mediator, individual
negotiating skills have "altered traditional power relations." '2 Furthermore, a
representative chosen by a group or coalition should have prior negotiating
experience or other bargaining, persuasion, or leadership skills. It is likely that at
least one person in the community possesses these skills, even if technically
untrained.
Contrary to Amy's view, Susskind believes that mediators play an important
role in balancing power between the parties.63 To this effect, a mediator should
offer initial, basic negotiation training to help equalize ability levels.' Initial
59. Id. In the interest of suppressing conflicts of interest among coalition group members, the
representative should also keep the mediator informed of all core member objectives. The mediator
should continue to enrich the discussion of interests and create additional issues and value. Thus, all
coalition group members can observe the "package" of issues agreed upon as a satisfactory outcome.
60. BINGHAM, supra note 1, at xxiv. Bingham found that a representative's authority to
implement a decision was the single most important factor for reaching agreement. Id.
61. SuSSKIND, supra note 48, at 118-19.
62. STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND
OTHER PRoCEssES 351-52 (2d ed. 1992).
63 SussKiND, supra note 8, at 208.
64. Id.; CROWFOOT, supra note 8, at 167-68. Crowfoot offers an example of training by the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency in their negotiated rule-making program:
All participants...are invited to attend an eight-hour training session that
occurs before the first full negotiation meeting. The objectives of this
training are:
1. To educate participants about fundamentals of negotiations;
2. To improve the participants' awareness of the dynamics of disputes;
3. To develop negotiating skills, bargaining strategies and style; and
1996]
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training can empower groups and provide them with the confidence and skills
needed to prevent their co-optation as the "inexperienced" party. Further, this
training should not affect the perceived neutrality of the mediator since training
is available equally to all groups.
2. Agenda-Setting By All Groups
Parties should then be given an equal chance to determine the agenda.65
Determining the agenda includes setting the rules, protocols and codes of
conduct.66  Through agenda setting, the parties can establish procedures to
ensure that each party has an equal opportunity to be heard. For instance, parties
can set forth an order of speaking, a time limit, rules against interruption,
attendance requirements and other procedures. Also, the parties should decide the
issue of each party's responsibility to provide information and technical support.67
Prominent proponents of environmental mediation, including Gail Bingham
and Larry Susskind, note that mediators play a very important role in ensuring that
the participants abide by these rules and conduct a fair process.6" Mediators in
this role should continue to abide by professional standards and ethics to maintain
their credibility.69
3. The Use of Integrative Procedures
Integrative procedures such as workshops, brainstorming, role-playing and
other tools can be used by the mediator to ensure that the groups conduct the
process in good faith.7" These procedures can improve communication and trust
between the groups and endow the parties with a win-win conception of the
process.7 This type of close interaction can result in a greater appreciation of
opposing views72 and lead toward a consensual solution that considers the
4. To demonstrate ways to apply these skills in the upcoming session.
65. Cecilia Albin, The Role of Fairness in'Negotiation, 9 NEGOTIATION J. 223, 228 (1993).
66. Id.; See also Gerald W. Cormick, Strategic Issues in Structuring Multi-Party Public Policy
Negotiations, 5 NEGOTIATION J. 125, 126-27 (1989).
67. BINGHAM, supra note 1, at 119-20; CROWFOOT, supra note 8, at 21-22.
68. BINGHAM, supra note 1, at 162-67; SUSSKIND, supra note 8, at 140-50; see also Judith L.
Maute, Public Values and Private Justice: A Case For Mediator Accountability, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 503, 521 (1991).
69. See SPIDR's ETHICAL STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIUTY (1986); MODEL
STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS (1995).
70. Albin, supra note 65, at 232-33.
71. Id at 232-33, 237; Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Many Ways of Mediation: The
Transformation of Traditions, Ideologies, Paradigms and Practices, 11 NEGOTIATION J. 217, 227
(1995) (book review). Menkel-Meadow reviews WHEN TALK WORKS by Deborah Kolb, which
explores the use of several innovative techniques. Menkel-Meadow lists several of these techniques,
including among many others "Linda Colbum's use of surprise or 'disorientation' ... to shake parties
out of their usual repertoires of behavior, to encourage their creativity or to get them to be more
revealing" and Albie Davis's communication models "of encouraging the parties to treat each other
with respect - an 'as if you were equal' approach that can help balance power and create greater
appreciation of equality in a mediation." Id. at 227.
72. Freeman, supra note 7, at 139.
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interests of all groups.73 Even though a group should constantly assess and revise
its position, it should always focus on its goals and not compromise its core
interests.
If a group refuses to act in good faith, the other groups in the coalition are
free to walk away from the mediation process. In such an event, a group may lose
the opportunity to have its concerns met.74 The mediator should keep the parties
aware of this potential loss." This awareness along with the integrative
procedures should sufficiently act as incentives for the groups to proceed in good
faith. Another technique to ensure good faith participation would be to publicize
the process or the outcome through media attention, a consent decree, or other
measures. If utilized, all parties should agree on one of these techniques.
b. Procedures to Increase Access to Information and Technical Support
As mentioned above, critics of mediation are concerned that parties coming
into the mediation process with unequal information and technical skills will
unwittingly compromise their interests or have their interests undermined by
others. These concerns can also be mitigated through actions taken by parties and
the mediator to equalize such resources.
1. Sharing Information Between Groups
Guidelines for formalizing and legitimating the exchange of existing
information and its impact should be established during the agenda-setting stage
of the mediation process.76 Good faith sharing of information is more likely to
73. Id. Central to this notion is that each group brings different resources and interests to the
mediation. Because each party views resources and interests differently, the parties may trade to their
mutual gain and arrive at a mutually satisfactory solution. Id.
74. BINGHAM, supra note 1, at 116-17. Bingham cites, as an example, a case where citizen
opposition arose to the development of a recycling plant after the company had obtained local permits.
Both groups, however, agreed to mediation and were exploring options when one member of the
citizens' group acted unilaterally, initiating litigation without consulting anyone. The company
withdrew from the mediation. "In the end, the court authorized the company to proceed with the new
plant site, and the local citizens lost the opportunity to resolve some of their concerns." Id.
75. SUSSKIND, supra note 8, at 164. In fact, "the long-term credibility of a mediator depends on
ensuring that every possible effort was made to meet the interests of all the parties involved." Id.
76. CROWFOOT, supra note 8, at 2 1-22, 165. Unlike the adversarial nature of litigation, where
it is common practice for attorneys to bury critical evidence in a mountain of paperwork or otherwise
hide information, parties in the collaborative mediation context should be more willing to share
information in good faith. Here though, one must query whether the mediation context can, in reality,
change the culture to the extent that typically adversarial groups can work together in good faith. More
empirical evidence is necessary. Based on Bingham's and Susskind's experiences, however, it appears
possible for parties to successfully work together in a non-adversarial nature. For example, Susskind
found that in a negotiated rule-making session used by the EPA as a demonstration, relations between
traditionally adversarial parties, including the EPA, environmental groups, state organizations,
agricultural user groups, and manufacturers, improved markedly. GOLDBERG, supra note 62, at 349-50
(citing Lawrence Susskind and Gerald McMahon, The Theory and Practice of Negotiated Rulemaking,
3 YALE J. ON REG. 133, 143-59 (1985)). Further, "in the eyes of the participants and others closely
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occur as trust builds between the mediation groups through the use of integrative
procedures and as these groups keep in mind the goal of finding a mutually
acceptable solution. Companies concerned about the release of proprietary or
confidential information can use a mediator as a "repository for information,
issuing summaries of findings without mentioning particular companies."77
A developer, company, or other entity proposing a project has an incentive
to share information. Such sharing can help the proposing entity clarify
misunderstandings about its proposal and the related consequent environmental
impacts and prevent later litigation.78 Furthermore, if the community or a public
interest group shares information about its concerns, then the project proponent
may modify its proposal or make additional offers that satisfy these concerns more
effectively. 9 Further incentives to share information can be provided by
pressuring a political figure to use the Freedom of Information Act or other
political and legislative means to compel government groups involved in the
dispute to provide pertinent information."0
2. Methods Other Than Group Sharing
Information on a particular project and its potential impacts may not exist,
or community and public interest groups may wish to independently assess the
impacts of a proposed project. When information does not exist, groups must
agree on formalized measures to develop the needed data. When community or
public interest groups seek independent analysis or clarification of data, several
techniques are available to do so.
a. Technical Expertise of Members
Community and public interest groups can develop a membership which
includes individuals with technical expertise."' It is likely that within any one
community, regardless of its class or race, there are individuals willing to become
involved in the group(s) who have technical expertise directly relevant to the
dispute, or knowledge that is transferable to the dispute, or skills necessary to
achieve that knowledge. These individuals can apply their expertise and share
their understanding of the issue with other group members.
b. Sympathetic Groups
Community groups can look to mainstream environmental groups, science
and technical organizations, universities and other groups that might have relevant
observing the process, negotiated rulemaking appeared to produce more legitimate outcomes .. ." Id.
at 350.
77. SUSSKIND, supra note 8, at 145.
78. BINGHAM, supra note 1, at 86.
79. Id.
80. CROWFOOT, supra note 8, at 165.
81. Id at 164; SussKIND, supra note 8, at 210.
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studies or that have been involved in similar processes to obtain needed data and
clarify issues.8 2
With the advent of new technologies, the scope of attainable knowledge is
broadened considerably. The World Wide Web, a global network of computers
that is part of the Internet, was originally created in 1989 to help scientists share
information.83 Community groups can access these global computer networks to
obtain this scientific and technical knowledge for use in the mediation process.8 4
Furthermore, these groups can establish home pages detailing their experiences in
mediating or opposing development projects which can be used by subsequent
groups.
The Internet remains in its infancy in terms of exploring its development and
capabilities and gaining access to the Internet by those unable to afford computers
and modems. The city of Santa Monica, however, has funded and set up fifteen
public access terminals in libraries, banks, outdoor shopping areas, and other
sites.8 5 Surprisingly, the homeless were among the heaviest users of these
terminals.86 Precedent now exists for other cities to follow Santa Monica's
guidance and provide access to the Internet for disadvantaged groups.
Furthermore, although it is early in the Internet's life cycle, the possibility exists
that regulations or laws might be initiated to mandate access to the information
superhighway for disadvantaged groups.
c. Mediator Expertise
Lawrence Susskind espouses and practices the controversial notion that a
mediator should bring technical knowledge to the mediation process.87 A
mediator can accomplish this by either possessing such knowledge himself or
herself or by creating a team of mediators which include technical experts
possessing such knowledge.88 The advantage of mediators possessing such
expertise is that every party seeking access to that expertise has it granted free of
skewed interpretations of the data.
82. SusSKiND, supra note 8, at 210. For instance, in a dispute involving the development of a
trash incineration plant, the city council looked to the local Academy of Sciences, a private
organization of scientists with a long record of service to the community, for help in reviewing
available scientific and technical evidence regarding the impact of the plant. Id. at 69.
83. Vic Sussman & Kenan Pollack, Gold Rush in Cyberspace, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT.
Nov. 13, 1995, at 72, 74.
84. Community groups can find guidance on how to use the Internet from members or
organizations providing access to the Internet or from other information available at local libraries.
85. Enid Coulsen, The Hole in the Donut: Electronic Redlining and Universal Access to the
Superhighway 33-35 (Fall 1995) (on file with author).
86. Id.
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c. Procedures to Fund Disadvantaged Groups' Participation
in the Process and Access to Information
1. Resource Pool Among Parties or Independently Funded
Once parties agree in earnest to pursue mediation, it may be necessary to ask
the mediator to assist in creating a resource pool to fund mediation activities such
as travel expenses and joint fact finding.89 A resource pool is a "kitty" of money
which each group can draw upon as needed.9" Citizen groups are likely to have
the least resources to contribute to such a pool. Such citizens' groups, however,
may be unwilling to accept money from a more wealthy project proponent out of
concern that such acceptance would undermine the group's credibility.9' This
concern makes it essential that the mediator appoint an independent resource pool
manager.9' The mediator himself or an outside organization that has no
involvement in the mediation could be the independent resource pool manager.93
In the agenda-setting stage, each group should be given an equal role in
drafting guidelines for the use of the funds in the pool. 94 Once the funds are
turned over to the independent manager, however, individual contributors should
have no say in how the funds are allocated. 95
Another approach is to draw finances from a revolving fund financed by
organizations independent of the ongoing mediation effort. This approach is
especially attractive to citizen groups who are adamantly against taking funds from
a proponent-funded resource pool.96 In the mid-1980's, the National Institute for
Dispute Resolution ("NIDR") grappled with the issue of establishing a national
revolving fund, the Fund for Public Interest Mediation ("FPIM").97
Unfortunately, the fund never got off the ground because of the lack of donor
funding.98 Seeking primarily corporate funding, NIDR found it very difficult to
89. SussKiND, supra note 8, at 145.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 205.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 205-06. Examples of organizations that could serve as independent resource pool
managers are the local state office of mediation, the National Institute for Dispute Resolution
("NIDR"), private foundations such as The Conservation Foundation, and many other credible
organizations sympathetic to the mediation effort. From 1988 through 1991, NIDR served as the
independent repository for Environmental Protection Agency funds for use in negotiated rulemaking
situations. Telephone Interview with Tom Fee, Independent Consultant, former Vice President of NIDR
(Nov. 8, 1995) (hereinafter Fee Interview).
94. Fee Interview, supra note 93.
95. Id.
96. Note that Lawrence Susskind finds that, in his experience, the resource pool once funded
and independently managed, with no further party control, is not seen by the parties as politicized, but
is seen only as a means to achieve shared informational resources and technical analysis. Susskind
Interview, supra note 24.
97. Fee Interview, supra note 93.
98. Id.
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sell the concept of a public dispute fund to outcome-oriented corporate funders.99
NIDR did, however, begin giving small, outright grants under $10,000 to subsidize
parties in the beginning stages of the mediation process.0 0  The current
President of NIDR, Margie Baker, believes that a national revolving fund remains
a good idea.'0 '
To be a viable resource, however, implementation issues will have to be
resolved. These issues include marketing the idea of a fund to potential donors
by creating incentives such as positive publicity; determining who is responsible
for its administration by asking such questions as whether it has to be a credible
non-profit agency or whether it can be a governmental agency; determining who
is responsible for deciding what groups shall receive funds; and determining what
criteria that person should use to decide what groups shall receive funds. 2
Another source of independent funding consists of grants provided by
foundations such as the Conservation, Ford, and William A. and Flora Hewlett
foundations.'0 3
2. Fundraising
A group may pursue its own fundraising efforts by selling t-shirts, washing
cars, pursuing personal donations from members and local companies, and
conducting various other fundraisers. Because of the generally less public nature
of mediation, mediation may be seen as lowering the citizen groups' visibility.
This perception reduces the groups' ability to attract financial resources which are
critical to their survival and effectiveness.0 4 Despite this, the citizen group may
feel empowered through its participation in the process because it is given a direct
opportunity to inform the other parties of its priorities, to confront the views of
those parties and, as a result, to influence the decision making. Because of these
opportunities, a group and its potential members or donors may view the group's
efforts as having more substantive results than it would have in a process which
is not so party-determined. This feeling of empowerment may encourage the group
to devote more effort to informing its current members of the vital need for funds
to aid the mediation process and to renew its efforts to organize and canvas for
new members or donations with added success.
3. Donated Services
Many mediators volunteer their time or provide it at a substantially reduced
cost. Through environmental dispute resolution institutes, several state universities
provide mediation and other services.'0° Further, several law schools have
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Telephone Interview with Margie Baker, President of NIDR (Oct. 31, 1995).
102. Fee Interview, supra note 93.
103. BINGHAM, supra note 1, at 156.
104. CROWFOOT, supra note 8, at 4.
105. Id. at 154.
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established environmental justice law clinics. 106 Many of these same law schools
now have some type of negotiation or mediation classes available for students.
Because of these available resources, other environmental law clinics can establish
or access mediation services such as training mediators to aid a group the clinic
is involved with or which contacts the clinic. Groups can also look to local
science and technical organizations for fact-finding and clarification of technical
issues.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the end, the potential for an inequality of financial, technical, and other
resources to affect the mediation process is a potential also found in other
environmental dispute resolution contexts."°7 Empirical research is needed to
fully explain the role of inequality of resources. Until this role is fully explained,
the mediation process still allows groups to more actively and democratically
participate than they could in other dispute resolution contexts. Also, the flexible
setting of procedural safeguards in mediation helps mitigate any potential effect
of the inequality of resources. In providing these safeguards, mediation also
makes it more likely that the parties will be satisfied with the process and the
eventual outcome. Moreover, parties will reasonably perceive that they reached a
better agreement than they might have reached in another dispute resolution forum.
106. Hope Babcock, Environmental Justice Clinics: Visible Models ofJustice, 14 STAN. ENVrL.
L.J. 3, 6 (1995).
107. For example, Marc Galanter has acknowledged that litigation may offer an "artificial
equalizing of parties...by insulation from the full play of political pressures-the 'equality' of the parties,
the exclusion of 'irrelevant' material, the 'independence' of judges...." Marc Galanter, Why the
"Haves" Come OutAhead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SoC'Y REv. 95, 138
(1974). Such resources, however, reassert themselves at the implementation stage and, thus, the
"haves" will once again come out ahead. Id.
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